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Abstract 
The term auditor style to determine a unique set of internal working rules each audit firm to 
perform audit standards and application generally accepted accounting principles between their 
clients are used. Audit style implies that two companies audited by the same auditor, subject to the 
same audit style, are more likely to have comparable earnings than two firms audited by two 
different audit firms with different styles. The sample consists of 44 companies listed in Tehran 
Stock Exchange for the period 2002 to 2013. The tests are based on pairs of firms and a total of 
1958 pairs of firms as observations are used. In the present study used correlation method and 
multiple regression and is performed regression analysis for hypothesis test. The findings show that 
the clients of audit firms in the same industry and year than to their non-clients have more similar in 
accruals and earnings structure. Also the auditor style has an effect on clientele accruals, and that a 
change to the same auditor leads to more similar accruals. However, there is no evidence that a 
change to different auditors reduced comparability in the post-switch period. Finally the findings 
show that audit style is effective to comparability of financial statements. 
Keywords: Auditor Style, Comparability, Auditor Changes, Discretionary Accruals 
 
Introduction 
Comparability is defined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as "the 
quality of information that enables users to identify similarities and differences in the financial 
performance of two firms" (FASB, 1980). The joint conceptual framework project of FASB and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) emphasize that comparability is a basic property 
of financial information which enhances its usefulness (FASB, 2010). Indeed the FASB states that 
comparability in financial reporting is the primary reason for developing accounting standards 
(FASB, 1980) and the centrality of comparability is stressed in accounting textbooks, particularly 
financial statement analysis texts (Phillips et al., 2013, Revsine et al., 2011). 
The primacy of comparability as a qualitative characteristic of accounting makes it important 
to understand the factors that give rise to this characteristic. The emerging research into the 
determinants of comparability has focused on the role of accounting standards such as the adoption 
of IFRS (Barth et al., 2012, Lang et al., 2010). 
The concept and use of the word comparability are different in the literature. For the purpose 
of our study we define accounting comparability as the closeness of two firms’ reported earnings 
due to the consistency with which rules are applied across firms. In our empirical context, this 
means that firm-pairs in the same industry and fiscal year, and therefore subject to the same general 
economic shocks, are expected to have similar accruals and earning structure, all things being equal. 
However, there are frictions in the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of accounting 
standards which can reduce inter-company comparability. 
However, accounting standards on their own do not fully determine financial reporting 
outcomes; economic agents and institutional incentives also play an important role (Ball et al., 2003, 
Leuz et al., 2003).  
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Thus, the existence of uniform accounting standards does not necessarily lead to 
comparability of financial statements. But comparability is achieved when that two firms in the 
same industry and year, use the same accounting method for the same financial events. The subtle 
point is that, even when there is an absolute uniformity for a specific accounting standard, there is 
the possibility for the reduction of financial statements comparability as a result of different 
interpretations about the standard. So, the judgments and interpretations of people who are involved 
in the implementation of accounting standards, affect the comparability of financial statements. 
Although their judgments and interpretations about principles-based standards have a greater 
impact, previous research has shown that even in countries where the rules-based standards are used, 
comparability of financial statements is affected by involved people’s judgments and interpretations, 
despite having detailed implementation interpretation and guidelines. 
Finally, the financial statements, resulting from the accounting system, are achieved by 
auditors. Auditors’ responsibility is to comment on financial statements preparation and its 
conformity with accounting standards. In other words, auditors’ duty is to represent their opinion 
about the eligibility of financial statements preparation by using auditing standards. Audit 
institutions to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process, use a unique set of 
internal working rules for interpretation and implementation of auditing standards and for 
interpretation and application of accounting standards. These working rules give rise to what we 
term audit style, with the consequence that audit firms have systematic differences in their audit 
approaches, and in their interpretation and enforcement of accounting standards. So the main 
question of this study is: does the auditor style have any effects on comparability of financial 
statements? 
The current study focuses on the role of the auditor, and following Kothari et al. (2010) and 
Francis et al. (2013) researches. We argue that each audit firm has its own unique set of internal 
working rules that guide and standardize the auditor’s application of auditing and accounting 
standards.  
As a result, we expect reported accruals and earnings to be more consistent and comparable 
within an audit firm’s clientele than between audit firm clienteles. The premise is that two firms in 
the same industry-year and audited by the same auditor are more likely to have the same type of 
accrual adjustments due to audit methodology, and to make the same set of accounting choices and 
judgments in implementing GAAP. Therefore, the accruals structure of these firms will be more 
similar than that of two firms with different auditors where the effect of audit style will be 
randomized away. 
The existing debate and empirical evidence in regard to the production of comparability has 
focused almost exclusively on the role of standards themselves, especially FASB versus IFRS. The 
present study provides evidence that an economic institution -the auditor- is also an important factor 
in the production of financial statement comparability. If we confirm this hypothesis, evidence will 
be obtained in support of the joint FASB/IASB conceptual framework. It argues that accounting 
standards alone may not necessarily lead to comparability, but that the effects of standards are also 
dependent upon audit firms involved in the enforcement of GAAP.  
The study makes several contributions to the literature. Our study provides evidence that an 
economic institution –the auditor– is also an important factor in the production of financial 
statement comparability. Consistent with the joint FASB/IASB conceptual framework, our results 
suggest that accounting standards alone may not necessarily lead to comparability, but that the 
effects of standards are also dependent upon audit firms involved in the enforcement of GAAP. As 
such, we document a new channel through which auditor characteristics affect audited financial 
statements. 
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Second, we contribute to the debate on principles versus rules in the development of accounting 
standards by regulators. Kothari et al. (2010) argue that regulators should not be concerned with the 
potential for non-comparability if accounting standards are principle-based, because accountants and 
auditors who are involved in the day-to-day application of principles will develop “working rules” 
to standardize accounting practice (Kothari et al., 2010). Our results suggest that this standardization 
process occurs within the clientele of one auditor; however, there are significant “style differences” 
between audit firms that reduces inter-auditor comparability. 
Third, we contribute to the broader literature that examines the auditor’s role in the 
production of financial reports. This literature has mainly examined the role of auditing in curbing 
earnings management, which is related to the qualitative characteristic of “representational 
faithfulness” (FASB, 2010). We show that the unique style of audit firms affects the qualitative 
characteristic of comparability.  
We extend the concept of unique styles in the production of financial reports from 
individuals to accounting firms. Our findings are analogous to the results of Francis et al. (2013). 
We found that two firms in the same industry-year and audited by the same auditor have more 
comparable earnings than two firms audited by two different auditors.  
In the next sections, we first explain literature of the research and hypotheses development then 
research methodology is discussed, and finally it will be presented the findings, discussion and 
conclusion. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
This study examines the auditor style as one of the characteristics of an auditor, and tries to 
empirically evaluate the auditor style consequences on the audit results. Specifically, comparability 
of audited financial statements of companies will be studied through observation of differences 
between clients and non-clients of an audit firm; meanwhile, the evidence is obtained about the 
impact of auditor style. 
Therefore the theoretical foundations of this study are based on two areas of research in 
accounting and auditing. The first area is in the field of comparability of financial statements and 
second, research that examines the relationship between audit quality and auditor characteristics.  
De Franco et al. conceptually define financial statement comparability in two ways (De Franco et 
al., 2009). Their first definition is: 
"Two firms have comparable accounting systems if, for a given set of economic events, they produce 
similar financial statements." 
Their second conceptual definition of comparability is: 
"Firms with correlated economic events and similar accounting of these events will have correlated 
financial statements over time." 
The concept and use of the word comparability are different in the literature. For the purpose 
of our study we define accounting comparability as the closeness of two firms’ reported earnings 
due to the consistency with which rules are applied across firms. 
Antle and Nalebuff (1991), document that financial statements are jointly produced by 
clients and their auditors. The seminal empirical studies linking statistical properties of client 
financial statements with audit characteristics are Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) who 
document that the clients of Big 4 auditors have smaller abnormal or unexpected accruals than do 
the clients of non-Big 4 auditors, based on the well-known model of expected accruals developed by 
Jones (1991) and extended by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)(Francis, 2011).  
The basic research design which links earnings quality attributes to auditor characteristics is 
described in below: 
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Earnings quality = f (audit characteristics + controls for non-audit factors) 
It is very important to emphasize that audit characteristics are not direct measures of audit 
quality; rather, the above design tests if there are systematic differences in audit outcomes (earnings 
quality) conditional on certain audit characteristics. If there are systematic differences, then there is 
evidence consistent with the audit characteristics affecting earnings quality from which one can then 
infer audit-quality differences (Francis, 2011). 
Some of the accounting firm attributes that have been examined include accounting firm size 
(Big 4/non- Big 4), engagement office size (Francis and Yu, 2009, Choi et al., 2010), accounting 
firm industry expertise measured at both the national level and specific office level (Reichelt and 
Wang, 2010), accounting firm tenure with the client (Johnson et al., 2002), the presence of 
accounting firm alumni in executive positions in client firms (Lennox, 2000, Menon and Williams, 
2004), and the accounting firm’s fee dependence on the client (Frankel et al., 2002). 
These studies find that earnings quality is higher when the auditor is larger in both overall 
size and engagement office size, and when the auditor has more industry expertise. On the other 
hand, earnings quality is lower in the initial years of engagement tenure, and when audit firm alumni 
hold key executive positions in client firms (Francis, 2011). 
Auditors work for accounting firms and the outcome of the audit process is an audit report 
that is issued in the name of the accounting firm, along with the client’s audited financial statements, 
which can be viewed as the joint outcome of client inputs and proposed auditor adjustments. For 
firms are crucial to understanding audit quality because firms hire and train audit personnel, and 
incentivize auditors through compensation and other organizational policies. Firms also devise the 
audit programs and testing procedures that guide the evidence collection process, and firms have 
internal administrative structures to assure quality and compliance with their audit policies (Francis, 
2011). 
The unique character of audit methodologies implies that each firm’s audit approach will 
systematically detect or not detect the same client errors, including GAAP implementation errors. 
The implication is that financial statements will be more similar for firm-pairs with the same auditor 
than for firm-pairs with two different auditors each having different styles (Francis et al., 2013). 
Kinney, classified the then Big 8 accounting firms based on their use of unstructured, intermediate, 
and structured audit technologies. While audit methods/procedures must comply with generally 
accepted audit standards (GAAS), the audit standards are themselves rather general in nature and 
much more principles-based than is U.S. GAAP. This means that each accounting firm must devise 
its own in-house working rules for the efficient and consistent implementation of GAAS across its 
client base (Kinney, 1986). 
DeFond et al., point out that while comparability is the desired outcome of adopting a set of 
uniform accounting standards, uniformity alone does not necessarily result in comparability. In 
particular, the standards and in-house rules must also be faithfully implemented (DeFond et al., 
2011).  
While the importance of comparability has long been recognized by standard setters, and 
discussed in the academic literature at a conceptual and normative level, there is much less empirical 
research on comparability. Recent empirical papers have emerged in response to the development of 
new methodologies to measure comparability, and to the widespread adoption of IFRS. These 
papers examine how the adoption of IFRS affects financial statement comparability, and how 
improved comparability affects decisions by investors (Francis et al., 2013).  
Francis et al. showed that the absolute value of difference in discretionary accruals of two 
companies, audited by the same Big 4 auditor, is lower than the absolute value of difference in 
discretionary accruals of two companies audited by two different Big 4 auditors and two companies 
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audited by non-Big 4 auditors. The cause of this difference in the amount of discretionary accruals 
can be justified by difference in auditor style. Their findings also showed when two companies were 
audited by different auditors in previous years and then they change their auditors and use the same 
one, their comparability of the financial statements increases. But if a reverse change occurs, no 
evidence has been found to reduce comparability (Francis et al., 2013).  
Barth et al., examine the comparability of financial statements of non-U.S. firms that adopt 
IFRS with that of U.S firms, and find that IFRS adoption by non-U.S. firms enhances their financial 
statement comparability with U.S. firms (Barth et al., 2012). 
De Franco et al., find that earnings comparability within an industry is positively related to 
analysts’ following and accuracy, and negatively related to analysts’ optimism and dispersion in 
earnings forecasts (De Franco et al., 2011).  
Bradshaw et al., also study analysts and find that the commonality of accounting policy 
choices, their measure of comparability, affects analyst coverage and behavior (Bradshaw et al., 
2011). 
DeFond et al., show that mutual funds increase their foreign investment in countries with 
mandatory IFRS adoption, which they argue is due to improved cross country earnings 
comparability (DeFond et al., 2011). 
Lang et al., examine changes in cross-country financial statement comparability around 
mandatory IFRS adoption and document that IFRS adoption increases comparability, measured as 
cross-country earnings co-movement. Other recent papers have examined whether comparability 
affects the decisions of participants in the capital market (Lang et al., 2010). 
Turning to the auditing literature, a large body of research has examined the association of 
auditor characteristics with clients’ audited earnings. The seminal studies linking auditors and 
earnings attributes are Becker et al. and Francis et al., who document that Big 4 clients have smaller 
abnormal accruals than non-Big 4 clients(Becker et al., 1998, Francis, 1999). This stream of 
research has also examined other earnings attributes such as benchmark beating (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997, Frankel et al., 2002), accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, Doyle et al., 2007), 
and timely loss recognition (Basu, 1997, Krishnan, 2005).  
Becker et al., document that the clients of Big 4 auditors have smaller abnormal or 
unexpected accruals than do the clients of non-Big 4 auditors (Becker et al., 1998). 
Mohseni, in his dissertation argued that clients of other audit firms as members of certified 
public accountants society in the same industry and year have more similarity in accruals and 
earnings structure than clients of an audit organization (Mohseni, 2014). 
It is expected that the auditor style affects the clients’ financial statements. The previous 
research results confirm this fact. Therefore, we expect greater consistency between the financial 
statements of the two companies in the same industry-year and audited by same firm rather than two 
companies audited by two different firms. As mentioned in the previous sections, the cause of this 
expectation is the exposure of the two companies audited by same firm to the same audit style, while 
the two companies audited by two different firms are influenced by random audit style. Therefore, 
the first research hypothesis is stated as below: 
1. The comparability of financial statements of two companies which are exposed to the style of 
the same audit firm is more than two companies which are exposed to the style of two 
different audit firms. 
With the expectation of auditor style impact on comparability of financial statements, we can 
assume a situation during the course of review, in which two companies have changed their audit 
firm. In this case, there will be two states. In the initial state, these two companies had different 
auditors in previous years and then one of these companies changed its auditor, so that, the same 
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audit firm is the auditor of both companies. In this situation, after this change, we expected that the 
structures of discretionary accruals of given companies show more similarities to each other and this 
lessens the difference between discretionary accruals of two companies. This is due to the fact that 
the two companies are influenced a similar audit style. Under these expectations, the second 
research hypothesis is stated as below: 
2. The comparability of financial statements of two companies which have same auditor due to 
auditor change by one of them, is greater than when they have different auditors. 
In the second state, these two companies had a same auditor and then one of these companies 
changed its auditor. Therefore, after the change, they will have different auditors and will be 
exposed to different audit styles. Having such a picture, we expect to have some reduction in 
comparability of given companies, compared to the previous time. According to these expectations, 
the third research hypothesis is stated as below: 
3. Financial statements comparability of two companies which have different auditors, due to 
the change of auditor by one of them, is lower than the time when they have a same auditor. 
 
Methodology 
The population of this study consists of all accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange 
during the years 2002-2013. The Financial sector (comprised of banks, insurance companies and 
financial services companies) is excluded for two reasons: 
(1) Entities in this sector have different operating characteristics, and as a result, possess risk 
and complexity properties that are unique in nature and different from those of other sectors. 
(2) The unique characteristics of those entities make it impossible to compute the control 
variables or makes computing the variable of no meaning. 
Firms which do not comply with the sample criteria are deducted from the sample because of the 
potential noise and contaminating effect they might pose on the findings. 
The following are the sample criteria and requirements: 
 The firm’s shares should be listed for trading on the TSE during the years (2002-2013). 
 The firm’s financial statements must be available for the years (2002-2013), to provide for 
the financial data needed to calculate the study variables. 
 The firm’s auditor is not audit organization (governmental audit). 
The above-mentioned criteria of the population and sample should be considered as a limitation of 
the study, that is, as a result of these criteria a limited number of firms will be relevant for the 
analysis. 
Based on the above stated contents, the study sample consists of 44 companies selected out 
of seven industries such as automotive industry and components manufacturing, various food and 
beverage products, chemical and pharmaceutical products, textiles, machinery and equipment, basic 
metals and other non-metallic mineral products. Since in the present study the testing is based on 
firm-pairs, the firm-pairs are determined through a major category in each industry based on all 
possible binary combinations. For example, if there are three firms A, B, and C, then the firm-pairs 
would be A-B, B-C, and A-C. Accordingly, in the present study, 1958 firm-pairs determined are as 
the original sample. According to the research hypotheses, other sub-categories will be used within 
the main category. For testing the first research hypothesis, we examined original sample. Here, we 
expect that pairs of firms audited by the same audit firm, subject to the same audit style, have a 
greater comparability compared to pairs of firms audited by two different audit firms with different 
styles. So, more similarities between accrual structures of firm-pairs, with a same auditor, are 
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expected. This lessens the differences between the discretionary accruals. To test this expectation, 
we estimate the following regression model: 
 Diff_Abn_Accruals୧୨୲ = β଴ + βଵSame_audit୧୲ + βଶControls + E୧୨୲      )1(                                      
Here:  
ܵܽ݉݁_ܽݑ݀݅ݐ௜௧ is an index variable. This variable is a kind of explanatory variable and its value is 1 
for firm-pairs using same audit firm i in the year t and 0 for firm-pairs using different audit firms in 
the year t. Thus, this index variable compares the differences of discretionary accruals in firm-pairs 
exposed to the same audit style and firm-pairs exposed to random audit style. With the expectation 
of reduction in differences of discretionary accruals due to a same audit style, we predict a negative 
coefficient for this variable. 
Where ܦ݂݂݅_ܣܾ݊_ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௜௝௧ is the absolute value of the difference between signed abnormal 
accruals for firm-pairs in the same industry in year t. We calculate this variable for each firm i and 
firm j pairwise combination, for J firms in the same industry and fiscal year as follows: 
 Diff_Abn_Accruals୧୨୲ = abs൫Abn_Accruals୧୲ − Abn_Accruals୨୲൯     )2(                                     
    Where  ܣܾ݊_ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௜௧ are the abnormal accruals for firm i in year t and Abn_Accruals୨୲ the 
abnormal accruals for firm j in year t. Abnormal accruals are calculated using the Jones (1991) 
model of discretionary accruals, with control for contemporaneous performance as follows (Kothari 
et al., 2005):  
 TAAୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ =∝ +βଵ
ଵ
Aୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ + βଶ
(∆Sୟ୪ୣୱ౪ି∆Rୣୡ౪)
Aୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ + βଷ
PPE౪
Aୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ + βସROA + e୲        )3(       
 In this model, TA is total accruals, ΔSales is change in sales revenue, ΔAR is the change in 
accounts receivables, Assetst-1 is the beginning of year total assets, ROA is return on assets, PPE is 
property and equipment, and the subscript t denote year. The abnormal accruals represent the 
difference between total accruals and the estimated (fitted) normal accruals. Total accruals are 
calculated by working capital method adjusted for cash flows from extraordinary items scaled by 
beginning of year total assets as follows: 
TA = ∆CA − ∆Cash − ∆Cl + ∆STDEBT − Dep(Amo)      )4(                                                              
Where ∆CA is the change in current assets, ∆Cash is the change in cash and cash equivalents, ∆CL 
is the change in current liabilities, ∆STDEBT is the change in short-term debt, and Dep(Amo) is the 
depreciation and amortization expense. 
Control variables 
To eliminate alternative explanations that might arise whilst investigating the relationship 
between the variables, we control other cross-sectional factors that have been shown previously to 
contaminate the relationship because of their systematic effect on accruals. Controlling those 
variables would mitigate their systematic effects and lend the findings greater reliability. 
Since the dependent variable is calculated each year t for a pair of firms i and j, the control 
variables must also control for yearly characteristics of the firm-pair i and j. Following prior 
research that has used pairs of firms, we control for both the levels and differences in firm pair 
characteristics (De Franco et al., 2011, Francis and Yu, 2009). We control for levels by entering the 
minimum value in each year t for the paired control variables for firm i and j. The differences are 
measured by the absolute values of yearly differences in the control variable values for firm i and 
firm j. 
Control variables are total accruals, size, leverage, market-to-book, cash flow from 
operations, standard deviation of sales, standard deviation of cash flows, and sales growth. These 
variables are as defined above. 
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TA_Diff: Equals the absolute value of the difference between total accruals of firm i and total 
accruals of firm j in firm-pair in year t. 
Abn_Acc_Min: Minimum value of abnormal accruals in firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
Size_Diff: Absolute value of difference in size in firm-pair firm i and firm j. Size equals natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
Size_Min: Minimum value of size in firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
LEV_Diff: Absolute value of the difference in leverage in firm-pair firm i and firm j, where leverage 
is a debt to assets ratio of a company. 
LEV_Min: Minimum value of leverage in firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
MB_Diff: Absolute value of difference in market to book ratio in firm-pair firm i and firm j. Market 
to book ratio is calculated as market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
MB_Min: Minimum value of market to book ratio in firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
CFO_Diff: Absolute value of difference in cash flows from operations (scaled by total assets in year 
t–1) in firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
CFO_Min: Minimum value of scaled cash flows from operations in firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
STD_Sales_Diff: Absolute value of the difference in standard deviation of yearly sales in firm-pair 
firm i and firm j. Standard deviation of sales is calculated over the year t to year t–4. 
STD_Sales_Min: Minimum value of standard deviation of yearly sales in firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
STD_CFO_Diff: Absolute value of the difference in standard deviation of yearly operating cash flows 
in firm-pair firm i and firm j, where standard deviation of cash flows from operations is calculated 
over the year t to year t–4. 
STD_CFO_Min: Minimum value of the standard deviation of yearly cash flows from operations in 
firm-pair firm i and firm j. 
STD_Sales_Grth_Diff: Absolute value of the difference in standard deviation of yearly sales growth 
in firm-pair firm i and firm j, where standard deviation of sales growth is calculated over the year t 
to year t–4. Sales growth equals sales in current year t minus sales in year t–1 divided by sales in 
year t–1. 
STD_Sales_Grth_Min: Minimum value of the standard deviation of yearly sales growth in firm firm-
pair i and firm j. 
To test the second hypothesis, a sub-category within the main sample is used. Here we want 
to examine the situation in which the audit firm of firm-pairs has changed. At first we imagine that 
the given firm-pairs have different auditors and then one of them changes its auditor to have a same 
auditor with the other. As a result of this change, we expect that accruals structure shows greater 
similarities. To test this expectation, regression model in equation (1) is re-estimated for firm-pairs 
which had different auditors in the past but a same one in present time. 
 Diff_Abn_Accruals୧୨୲ = β଴ + βଵS_Switch୧୲ + βଶControls + E୧୨୲       )5(                                          
Here, S_Switch୧୲ is an index variable which has a value of 1 in the year of change and years after 
change, till the change persistence and a value of 0 in the years before change (having different 
auditors). So, this index variable compares the differences in discretionary accruals of firm-pairs 
before and after the change occurred. With the assumption of reduction in differences of 
discretionary accruals due to a same audit style, we predict a negative coefficient for this variable. 
Dependent variable and the control variables are similar to what was stated in equation (1). 
In the third hypothesis, we consider a situation in which the firm-pairs have a same auditor 
and then one of them changes its auditor. So, after this change, the firm-pairs have different 
auditors. As a result of this change, we expect that accruals structure shows greater differences. To 
test this expectation, regression model in equation (5) is re-estimated for firm-pairs’ sub samples 
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which had a similar auditor in the past but different auditors in present time. Otherwise, we use the 
index variable of  D_Switch୧୲. This variable has the value of 1 in the year of change and years after 
change, till the change persistence and a value of 0 in the years before change (having same 
auditors). The model is as below: 
 Diff_Abn_Accruals୧୨୲ = β଴ + βଵD_Switch୧୲ + βଶControls + E୧୨୲     )6(                                           
So, this index variable compares the differences in discretionary accruals of firm-pairs before and 
after the change occurred. With the assumption of enhancement in differences of discretionary 
accruals due to different audit styles, we predict a positive coefficient for this variable. Dependent 
variable and the control variables are similar to what was stated in equation (1). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Summarized descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study are presented in Table 1. 
Main classification of statistical sample consists of 1958 observations. In the following, sub-
categories will be used. Mean of dependent variable or the absolute value of difference in 
discretionary accruals between firm-pairs is 14.8 percent of total assets.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Median STD Min Max  
Abn_Accr_Diff 1958 0.148 0.100 0.358 0.000 8.936 
TA_Diff 1958 0.154 0.101 0.369 0.000 9.022 
Size_Diff 1958 1.032 0.893 0.804 0.000 5.140 
LEV_Diff 1958 0.185 0.151 0.152 0.000 0.822 
MB_Diff 1958 2.372 1.227 4.226 0.001 40.231
CFO_Diff 1958 0.186 0.131 0.379 0.000 8.987 
STD_Sales_Diff 1958 0.114 0.084 0.108 0.000 0.731 
STD_CFO_Diff 1958 0.079 0.054 0.166 0.000 3.933 
STD_Sales_Grth_Diff 1958 0.169 0.096 0.201 0.000 0.890 
Abn_Accr_Min 1958 -0.064 -0.044 0.350 -8.487 0.464 
Size_Min 1958 12.433 12.487 0.812 10.528 14.797
LEV_Min 1958 0.525 0.548 0.167 0.057 0.976 
MB_Min 1958 2.093 1.638 2.166 -1.766 33.298
CFO_Min 1958 0.109 0.098 0.128 -0.482 1.061 
STD_Sales_Min 1958 0.139 0.132 0.069 0.008 0.609 
STD_CFO_Min 1958 0.093 0.079 0.064 0.015 0.431 
STD_Sales_Grth_Min 1958 0.142 0.128 0.077 0.018 0.888 
 
Table 2, shows the correlation between the dependent variable, i.e., the absolute value of 
difference in firm-pairs discretionary accruals and test variables. Correlation of these two test 
variables, including same auditor (Same_audit) and switching to the same auditor (S_Switch), is 
negative. This shows that there is an inverse relationship between these variables and the dependent 
variable. Test variable coefficient for switching to a different auditor (D_Switch), is positive which 
shows the direct relationship between switching to a different auditor and the difference of firm-
pairs accruals. In other words, the switching to a different auditor increases the gap between firm-
pairs’ accruals. But the coefficient of test variables is not statistically significant. 
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Table 2. Correlation Coefficients Between Abn_Accr_Diffand Test Variables 
Test Variables N Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) 
Same_audit 1958 -.013 .562 
S_Switch 181 -.011 .887 
D_Switch 128 .019 .835 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
A multiple linear regression model is used for the variables used in each equation to measure 
the level of discretionary accruals and test each of the hypotheses. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is 
used for measuring the significance of model used to test the research hypotheses and adjusted R2 is 
used for measuring explanatory power of these models. 
The term audit style is used to characterize the unique set of internal working rules of each 
audit firm for the implementation of auditing standards, and the enforcement of GAAP within their 
clienteles. In the first research hypothesis, the same auditor test variable (Same_audit) is used to 
control the effect of audit style. This variable has the value of 1, when the given firm-pairs use a 
same audit firm, and value of 0, when the given firm-pairs use two different audit firms.  
 
Table 3. OLS Results for Discretionary Accruals Comparability Tests 
Variables Coefficients T-Statistic P-value   
Intercept .223 6.867 .000 *** 
Same_audit -.014 -2.354 .019 ** 
TA_Diff .553 43.506 .000 *** 
Size_Diff -.006 -2.878 .004 *** 
LEV_Diff -.049 -3.397 .001 *** 
MB_Diff .000 .757 .449  
CFO_Diff .028 2.196 .028 ** 
STD_Sales_Diff .013 .937 .349  
STD_CFO_Diff .086 4.347 .000 *** 
STD_Sales_Grth_Diff -.002 -.267 .789  
Abn_Accr_Min -.372 -20.993 .000 *** 
Size_Min -.011 -5.164 .000 *** 
LEV_Min -.073 -4.756 .000 *** 
MB_Min .005 5.864 .000 *** 
CFO_Min -.265 -13.862 .000 *** 
STD_Sales_Min -.042 -1.672 .095 * 
STD_CFO_Min .186 6.767 .000 *** 
STD_Sales_Grth_Min -.008 -.356 .722  
Model N R
2 Adjusted R2 F 
Sig. 
1958 .967 .967 3391 0.000 
Diff_Abn_Accruals୧୨୲ = β଴ + βଵSame_audit୧୲ + βଶControls + E୧୨୲ 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Comparability of financial statements as a dependent variable is measured by using the 
difference between firm-pairs’ discretionary accruals. So, in this way, established differences among 
the observations as a result of the test variable change become clear. First research hypothesis test 
results are shown in Table 3. As reported in this table, the results show that the predicted coefficient 
of the test variable (Same_audit) is negative, in accordance to our expectations. This coefficient is 
statistically significant at the level of p <0.05. The adjusted R2 for this model is 96.7% and its 
significant level is 0.000 which shows that this model is able to explain 96.7% of the changes in the 
dependent variable, the absolute value of difference in firm-pairs’ discretionary accruals. These 
results can be used as evidence in support of the first hypothesis of this study. 
As a result, the clients of a certain audit firm have a more similar accruals structure with 
each other compared to other audit firm clients. In other words, the firm-pairs, which use a same 
audit firm and audit style, have a more similar accruals structure with each other compared to other 
firm-pairs using different audit firm and random audit style. 
The second research hypothesis presents our expectation about the change of firm-pairs’ 
auditor toward having a same auditor.  Here, we suppose a situation in which the firm-pairs had two 
different auditors and one of the firms changes auditor to have the same auditor as the other firm, 
then after the switch we should observe a more similar accruals structure resulting in smaller 
differences because the two firms are now subject to the style effects of the same auditor. 
 
Table 4. OLS Results for Discretionary Accruals Comparability Tests. Pair of firms switch to 
same auditor 
Variables Coefficients T-Statistic P-value   
Intercept .124 1.201 .231   
S_Switch -.020 -2.065 .041 ** 
TA_Diff .437 11.844 .000 *** 
Size_Diff -.002 -.330 .742 
LEV_Diff -.146 -3.886 .000 *** 
MB_Diff -.001 -.808 .420 
CFO_Diff .040 1.108 .270 
STD_Sales_Diff .018 .353 .725 
STD_CFO_Diff .118 2.050 .042 ** 
STD_Sales_Grth_Diff .000 -.005 .996 
Abn_Accr_Min -.445 -8.558 .000 *** 
Size_Min .001 .160 .873 
LEV_Min -.151 -3.168 .002 *** 
MB_Min .005 2.891 .004 *** 
CFO_Min -.320 -6.305 .000 *** 
STD_Sales_Min .025 .338 .736 
STD_CFO_Min .347 4.300 .000 *** 
STD_Sales_Grth_Min -.040 -.623 .534   
Model N R
2 Adjusted R2 F Sig. 
181 .849 .833 54 0.000 
Diff_Abn_Accruals୧୨୲ = β଴ + βଵS_Switch୧୲ + βଶControls + E୧୨୲ 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Here, we use switching to the same auditor test variable (S_Switch). This variable has the 
value of 1 in the year of change and years after change, till the change persistence and a value of 0 
in the years before change (having different auditors). Dependent variable is the same as what we 
have in the previous hypothesis. So, by this method, the differences between the observations 
resulting from the changes in test variables become clear. Second research hypothesis test results are 
shown in Table 4. 
As reported in this table, the results show that the predicted coefficient of the test variable 
(S_Switch) is negative, in accordance to our expectations. This coefficient is statistically significant 
at the level of p <0.05. Adjusted coefficient of determination for this model is 83.3% and its 
significant level is 0.000 which shows that this model is able to explain 83.3% of the changes in the 
dependent variable, the absolute value of difference in firm-pairs’ discretionary accruals. 
These results can be used as evidence in support of the second hypothesis of this study. As a 
result, the differences between discretionary accruals of the firm-pairs which had different auditors 
and have a same auditor now, are reduced due to the use of a same auditing style. The results 
provide substantial evidences for years around auditor changes. This evidences show that the audit 
style affects the client discretionary accruals and switching to the same auditor brings about more 
similar discretionary accruals. 
 
Table 5. OLS Results for Discretionary Accruals Comparability Tests. Pair of firms switch to 
different auditor 
Variables Coefficients T-Statistic P-value   
Intercept .350 3.231 .002 *** 
D_Switch -.011 -.965 .336 
TA_Diff .437 9.922 .000 *** 
Size_Diff -.003 -.386 .700 
LEV_Diff -.183 -3.637 .000 *** 
MB_Diff .001 .767 .445 
CFO_Diff -.110 -1.950 .054 * 
STD_Sales_Diff .027 .542 .589 
STD_CFO_Diff .187 1.937 .055 * 
STD_Sales_Grth_Diff -.007 -.162 .872 
Abn_Accr_Min -.631 -7.928 .000 *** 
Size_Min -.013 -1.846 .068 * 
LEV_Min -.254 -4.567 .000 *** 
MB_Min .019 5.415 .000 *** 
CFO_Min -.509 -6.734 .000 *** 
STD_Sales_Min .047 .558 .578 
STD_CFO_Min .429 3.175 .002 *** 
STD_Sales_Grth_Min -.093 -.731 .466   
Model 
N R2 Adjusted R2 F Sig. 
128 .850 .827 37 0.000 
Diff_Abn_Accruals୧୨୲ = β଴ + βଵD_Switch୧୲ + βଶControls + E୧୨୲ 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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The third research hypothesis presents our expectation about the change of firm-pairs’ 
auditor toward having different auditors. Here, we suppose a situation in which the firm-pairs had a 
same auditor and one of them changes auditors so that the firm pair now has two different auditors. 
Here, we use switching to different auditors test variable (D_Switch). This variable has the value of 
1 in the year of change and years after change, till the change persistence and a value of 0 in the 
years before change (having a same auditor). Dependent variable is the same as what we have in the 
previous hypotheses. So, by this method, the differences between the observations resulting from the 
changes in test variables become clear. Third research hypothesis test results are shown in Table 5. 
As reported in this table, the results show that the predicted coefficient of the test variable 
(D_Switch) does not have any significant difference with zero. So, there is no evidence for 
decreasing the comparability to the period after the change by switching to different auditors. 
Although these asymmetry findings are contrary to our expectations and do not support the 
third research hypothesis, but validate that auditor selection is not random and it considers different 
expectations such as those concerning auditing results. This is the only explanation we can offer for 
these asymmetry findings. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
After controlling the economic shocks and firm specific factors, we expect the firm-pairs, 
with a same industry at the same year, to have similar accruals and earnings structure. Our tests 
show that the probability of these similarities is more when two companies have a same auditor. 
This is an evidence to prove the effect of audit firm style on resemblance of earnings and accruals 
for certain auditor’s clients. Although the existence a set of uniform accounting standards is 
necessary to increase financial statements comparability, but our study provides the evidence 
indicating that it is not enough and, besides that, the auditors also have an important role in 
preparing the comparable financial statements. Style within the audit firms grows due to its unique 
internal working rules for interpretation and implementation of accounting and auditing standards. 
Our results provide support for Kothari et al. (2010) who conjecture that when standards are 
principles-based, economic agents such as auditors will develop their own in-house rules which give 
rise to comparability in the production of financial statements. We find support for the idea that 
auditors develop in-house rules to facilitate comparability within their clientele. 
The findings of the study show the firm-pairs, with a same industry at the same year, which 
have a same auditor, have more similarities in term of accruals structure compared to firm-pairs 
which have different auditors. This shows that the style of audit firms makes some similarities in 
clients’ accruals structure and increases the comparability of financial statements. This evidence is 
in support of the first hypothesis and previous studies such as Francis et al (2013). They show that 
having auditor from one of the Big 4 firms or other audit firms, affects financial statements 
comparability. 
The study results show that financial statements comparability of firm-pairs, which had two 
different auditors and then, by changing one of these auditors, they have a same auditor now, 
increases. These findings confirm the impact of audit style on the financial statements comparability 
and support the second hypothesis. For the years surrounding the change of auditor, these results 
provide substantial evidence which shows the effect of audit style on the clients’ financial 
statements comparability and the effect of switching to the same auditor on enhancement of 
financial statements comparability. 
The results also indicate that switching to different auditors has no effect on financial 
statements comparability. Although these asymmetry findings are contrary to our expectations and 
do not support the third research hypothesis, but validate that auditor selection is not random and it 
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considers different expectations such as those concerning auditing results. The results of the second 
and third hypotheses experimental test are similar to the results of previous researches, including 
Francis et al (2013). 
In this study, the effect of audit style on accruals structure and its consequences such as 
financial statements comparability was examined. It is suggested that, for future research, pay more 
attention to other aspects of auditor style.  
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